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 397 
THE “ON-SALE” BAR TO PATENTABILITY: ACTUAL REDUCTION TO 
PRACTICE NOT REQUIRED IN PFAFF V. WELLS ELECTRONICS, INC.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 A patent2 grants to an inventor the exclusive right to prevent others from 
making, using, or selling his invention throughout the United States.3  However, 
an inventor is statutorily barred from receiving a patent for an invention that was 
“on sale” prior to one year before his U.S. filing date.4  An offer to sell cannot 
bar patentability  
                                                 
 1  119 S. Ct. 304 (1998). 
 2  An inventor’s right to a patent arises from Article I, Section 8, clause 8 of the 
United States Constitution which states:  
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 3  Congress expressly granted this right to exclusion in 35 U.S.C. § 154 which 
states: 
Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right 
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States, or importing into the United States . . . . 
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1984).  In exchange for the patent, the inventor must fully disclose 
to the public his invention including a full description of the invention, how to make and 
use the invention, and the best mode known to the inventor for carrying out his invention.  
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1984). 
 4  The statutory authority for the “on sale” bar to patentability is contained in 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b).  Section 102(b) states: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . .  
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a 
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior 
to the date of the application for patent in the United States. 
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1984).  The purpose of this statutory bar is to promote timely filing 
of a patent application, resulting in the teachings of the invention entering the public 
domain.  Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Alloy Surfaces Co., 339 F. Supp. 859, 865 (D. Del. 
1972).  An additional purpose is to prevent an inventor from commercially exploiting 
their invention prior to applying for a patent, thus extending their effective monopoly.  
James A. Jorgensen, Comment, Environmentally Dependent Inventions and the “On 
Sale” and “Public Use” Bars to 102 (b):  A Proffered Solution to a Statutory Dichotomy, 
49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 185, 193 (1994).  If the inventor has already received a patent for 
his invention, the patent is invalid.  Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Meaning of Term “On 
Sale” in 35 USCS § 102(b), Denying Patentability to Invention Which Has Been on Sale 
for More Than One Year Prior to Date of Patent Application, 25 A.L.R. FED. 486, *2b 
(1998).  Thus, in an infringement suit, § 102(b) may be used as an affirmative defense by 
the alleged infringer.  Id. 
1
Whitman: The "On-Sale" Bar to Patentability
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999
398          AKRON LAW REVIEW           [Vol. 32:2 
 
until an invention exists.5  The general issue in applying the “on sale” bar is “[a]t 
what point is the invention sufficiently developed such that, coupled with an 
offer to sell, the inventor’s commercial activities invoke the on sale bar?”6  The 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. once 
again affirmed that reduction to practice is not necessary to trigger this one year 
period7 (known as the “critical date”8).  This decision has serious effects for 
both sole inventors and big companies.9  This Note will discuss the background 
of the “on  
                                                 
 5  See generally Western Marine Elec. Co. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 
844-45 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 
613, 622 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 6  See Michael R. Schacht, UMC Electronics v. United States:  Should Reduction 
to Practice Be Required of the On Sale Bar?, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 131, 138 
(1988); see also Janice M. Mueller, Conception, Testing, Reduction to Practice:  When is 
it Really on Sale?, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 305, 306 (1998). 
 7  124 F.3d 1429, 1434 (Fed Cir. 1997); see also UMC Electronics Co. v. United 
States, 816 F.2d 647, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1987);  Barry N. Young, High Court To Say What 
Triggers ‘On-Sale’ Bar:  Must Inventions Be Reduced To Practice Or Just ‘Substantially 
Complete’ At The Time Of Sale?, The NAT’L L. J., Vol. 20, No. 43, June 22, 1998 
(calling the “on sale” bar a “somewhat unsettled area of patent law”); see also Edward G. 
Poplawski, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit:  Article:  The Impact of Federal Circuit Precedent on the “On-Sale” 
and “Public-Use” Bars to Patentability, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2351, 2352 (1995) (stating 
that the “law relating to the ‘on-sale’ and ‘public-use’ bars has long been a chaotic area of 
patent jurisprudence”). 
 8  In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 498 F.2d 271, 277 (5th Cir. 1974).  
The critical date is the date one year prior to the U.S. filing date of the application.  
Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 9  Steve Lash, Patent Case to go Before High Court /Texas Investor Fights 
Time-limit Definition, Hous. Chron., March, 10 1998, at 3, available in 1998 WL 
3565076. 
 Inventors, particularly those who fiddle in their basements and garages, 
will be paying close attention to his case.  Months before the invention is complete, 
small-time inventors must find people to finance the development of their ideas.  
 Big companies, seeking to cash in on these inventions, often use the so-
called ‘on-sale bar’ to a patent as a defense to allegations of patent infringement, 
arguing that the inventor sold his product, though not complete, more than one year 
before applying for protection. 
Id.  However, big companies are also the victims of the “on sale” bar because like the 
sole inventors, many attempt to commercialize their products prior to obtaining patent 
protection.  See generally., RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp., 887 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 
1989) (holding a patent for a computer display system invalid by reason of the on-sale 
bar). 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss2/7
  
sale” bar to patentability10 and the particular facts of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 
Inc.,11 and will analyze why the Supreme Court decided that the “on sale” bar 
does not require an actual reduction to practice of the invention.12 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
 Congress first enacted the “on sale” bar to patentability in the Patent Act of 
1839.13  In 1936, Congress reduced the “on sale” grace period from two years to 
one year.14  When Congress recodified the patent laws in 1952, the “on sale” bar 
remained virtually unchanged and was recodified as 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).15  In 
General Electric Co. v. United States, the Court of Claims stated four policy 
reasons for the “on sale” bar:16  
 
                                                 
 10  See infra Part II. 
 11  See infra Part III. 
 12  See infra Part IV. 
 13  William C Rooklidge & W. Gerard von Hoffmann, III, Reduction to Practice, 
Experimental Use, and the “On Sale” and “Public Use” Bars to Patentability, 63 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 5 (1988).  The Patent Act of 1839 stated: 
No patent shall be held to be invalid, by reason of such purchase, sale, or use prior to 
the application for a patent as aforesaid, except on proof of abandonment of such 
invention to the public; or that such purchase, sale, or prior use has been for more 
than two years prior to such application for a patent. 
Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, 5 Stat. 353, 354 (1839). 
 14  Hugh H. Matsubayashi, Note & Comment, In Re Mahurkar: The Federal 
Circuit’s Misapplied Focus on Commercialization in “On Sale” Bar Analysis, 72 WASH. 
L. REV. 267, 270 (1997) (citing Donald S. Chisum, Patents 6.01, at app. 19-55 (1996)); 
see also Rooklidge & Hoffmann, III, supra note 13, at 6 (stating that “[t]he ‘on sale’ and 
‘public use’ provision of the statute remained substantially the same for one hundred 
years, until 1939, when Congress reduced the two year grace period to one year”). 
 15  See Matsubayshi, supra note 14, at 284. 
 16  654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981); see also In re Caveny, 767 F.2d 671, 676 
(Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); UMC Electronics Co. v. United 
States 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1988); David W. Carstens et al., Conception and the 
“On Sale” Bar, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 395 (1993) (stating that the “courts often 
have utilized these underlying policies to help frame the issues in cases dealing with the 
‘on sale’ bar”); Stephen R. Schaefer, Comment, Envirotech Corp. v. Westech 
Engineering, Inc.:  The On-Sale Bar to Patentability and Executory Sales Offers, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 1505, 1514 (1991) (stating that courts analyze the facts surrounding the 
application of the on-sale bar “within a framework that accommodates the policies behind 
the on-sale bar”). 
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(1) [T]here is a policy against removing inventions from the public which the 
public has justifiably come to believe are freely available to all as a 
consequence of prolonged sales activity . . .17 
                                                 
 17  See Schaefer, supra note 16, at 1516-17 (discussing Congress’ intent to 
use the “on sale” bar to avoid detrimental public reliance). 
4
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(2) [T]here is a policy favoring prompt and widespread disclosure of new 
inventions to the public . . .18 
(3)  [T]o prevent the inventor from commercially exploiting the exclusivity of 
his invention substantially beyond the statutorily authorized 17-year period . 
. .19 
(4)  [T]o give the inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales activity 
to determine whether a patent is a worthwhile investment . . . .20 
                                                 
 18  See id. at 1517 (discussing how prompt and accurate disclosure of an 
invention promotes the progress of science and technology). 
 19  See id. at 1515 (discussing the monopoly that is granted by a patent and 
its relation to anti-trust laws). 
 20  Id. at 1519 (discussing that the one year grace period allows an inventor 
to determine if patent protection is necessary and allows the inventor’s attorney 
time to thoroughly research and prepare a patent application). 
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Since Congress did not define the meaning of the term “on-sale,” the Federal 
Circuit considers these four policies in determining when an invention is barred 
by the on-sale bar.21 
 
A. The “On-Hand” Doctrine 
 
 A major problem for the courts in applying the “on sale” bar is determining 
the degree of completeness required for an invention to be “on sale.”22  The “on 
hand” doctrine is a test that the courts previously applied to the “on sale” bar.23  
The “on hand” doctrine required the invention to be produced and on hand for 
delivery before the critical date was triggered.24  A number of exceptions to the 
                                                 
 21  See Carstens, supra note 16, at 394; see also Rooklidge & Hoffmann, III, 
supra note 13, at 44. 
 22  Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 623 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 976 (1985); see also Thomas K. Landry, Certainty 
and Discretion in Patent Law:  The On Sale Bar, The Doctrine of Equivalents, and 
Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1167 (1994) (stating that 
“the [Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit] still struggled with the hackneyed old idea 
that some stage of development had to be reached before the on sale bar could be 
triggered”). 
 23  C.f. Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 
831, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that “[f]or an invention to be on sale under the ‘on 
hand’ rule, ‘a device incorporating the invention must have existed in its ordinary or 
contemplated usable form, and must have been on hand and ready for delivery more than 
one year prior to the patent application filing date’ ”); Matsubayashi, supra note 14, at 
274 (stating that “[o]ne early test, known as the ‘on hand’ doctrine, required that a device 
be produced and on hand for delivery in order for an offer to sell that device to invoke the 
‘on sale’ bar”).   The “on hand” doctrine is traced back to two cases: McCreery Eng’g 
Co. v. Massachusetts Fan Co, 195 F. 498 (1st Cir. 1912); and Burke Electric Co. v. 
Independent Pneumatic Tool Co., 234 F. 93 (2d Cir. 1916), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 682 
(1916).  Ronald J. Schutz & Darren B. Schwiebert, Column, On-Sale Bar Requires a 
More Complete Invention, THE NAT’L L. J. c19 (1997). 
 24  Barmag, 731 F.2d at 836 (quoting Galland-Henning Mfg. Co. v. Dempster 
Bros., 315 F. Supp. 68, 80 (E.D. Tenn. 1970)) (stating “[f]or an invention to be on sale 
under the ‘on hand’ rule, ‘a device incorporating the invention must have existed in its 
ordinary or contemplated usable form, and must have been on hand and ready for 
delivery more than one year prior to the patent application filing date’ ”).  Although 
determining when the invention became on hand and ready for delivery resulted in 
uncertainty in the patent litigation, the “on hand” doctrine “provided inventors and the 
public alike with the most certainty they ever enjoyed” in determining the triggering of 
the critical date for the on sale bar.  See Landry, supra note 22, at 1161. 
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“on hand” doctrine were created,25 and in 1975, the “on hand” doctrine was 
replaced with the “reduction to practice” test.26 
 
B. The “Reduction to Practice” Test 
 
 The “reduction to practice” test established a three part test for applying the 
“on sale” bar:27  (1) “The complete invention claimed must have been embodied 
in or obvious in view of the thing offered for sale . . . .”28  (2) “The invention 
must have been tested sufficiently to verify that it is operable and commercially 
marketable . . . .”29  (3) “[T]he sale must be primarily for profit rather than for 
                                                 
 25  See Matsubayashi, supra note 14, at 274.  “[C]ourts, however, typically 
carved out an exception to the “on-hand” doctrine where the activity involved a display 
of operable samples before the critical date, even though no production models were 
available for delivery until after the critical date.”  See Edward G. Poplawski & Paul D. 
Tripodi, II, The Impact of Federal Circuit Precedent on the “On-Sale” and “Public-Use” 
Bars to Patentability, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2351, 2365 (1995); see also Philco Corp. v. 
Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp. 797, 817 (D. Del.1961) (stating that the determination of 
whether an invention is on-sale “is a question of fact to be determined upon all the 
evidence and in light of all the circumstances of the case”). 
 26  Timely Products Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1975).  In Timely 
Products, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the “on hand” doctrine 
determining that the “on hand” doctrine allowed an invention to be exploited without 
triggering the “on sale” bar as long as the invention was not yet produced.  Id. at 299-300.   
 27  Id. at 302. 
 28  Id.  Obviousness is statutorily defined in 35 U.S.C. § 103 which states: 
(a)  A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the 
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was 
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter 
pertains. . . . 
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1984).  For a more comprehensive discussion of non-obviousness under 
§ 103, see Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Application and Effect of 35 U.S.C.A. § 103, 
Requiring Nonobvious Subject Matter, In Determining Validity of Patents, 23 A.L.R. 
FED. 326 (1975 and Supp. 1998). 
 29  Timely Products, 523 F.2d at 302.  The court states that this requires both 
conception and reduction to practice.  Id. (citing  Hobbs v. Atomic Energy Commission, 
451 F.2d 849, 859 (5th Cir. 1971)).  The term reduction to practice is a term of art.  
Gould Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 583 (Ct. Cl. 1978).  Constructive reduction to 
practice occurs when a patent application is filed that meets the requirement of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 (a written description of the invention, enablement, best mode).  See Chisum, supra 
note 14, at § 10.05(1).  “Actual reduction to practice occurs when the inventor (1) 
constructs a product or performs a process that is within the scope of the patent claims, 
and (2) demonstrates the capacity of the inventive idea to achieve its intended purpose.”  
See id. at § 10.06.  “[Actual] ‘reduction to practice' includes not only this reduction to 
7
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experimental purposes . . . .”30  The “reduction to practice” test lessened the 
requirements for the “on sale” bar from the “on-hand” test.31   
 
C. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
 
 By enacting the Federal Courts Improvement Act, Congress created the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.32  Effective October 1, 
1982, this Act transferred jurisdiction over all appeals arising under the patent 
laws to the Federal Circuit.33  In determining the completion of the invention 
                                                                                                                         
reality (building of a model of the invention) but also sufficient testing or 
experimentation to demonstrate that the device as it exists possesses sufficient utility to 
justify a patent, i.e., that the invention is suitable for its intended purpose.”  Gould Inc., 
579 F.2d at 583. 
 30  Timely Products, 523 F.2d at 302.  For more information on the experimental 
use doctrine, see Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877) (stating that “it is in the 
interest of the public . . . that the invention should be perfect and properly tested, before a 
patent is granted for it.”); T.P. Labs., Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 
970 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984) (stating that “when an experiment 
tolls section 102(b), the one-year period of limitations commences to run when the 
invention disclosed proves workable.”); Jay D. Schainholz, Note, The Validity of Patents 
After Market Testing: A New and Improved Experimental Use Doctrine?, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 371, 383 (1985) (discussing the application of the experimental use doctrine to 
product market testing). 
 31  See Matsubayashi, supra note 14, at 274.  While the on hand test required the 
invention to be on hand and ready for delivery, the reduction to practice test only required 
that a physical embodiment of the invention exist and be sufficiently tested at the time of 
the offer for sale for the “on sale” bar to apply.  Id. at 274-75; see also Landry, supra note 
22, at 1162. 
 32  Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1998)).  
The codified provision establishes the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.  Section 1995(a)(1) grants the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals from 
district courts if the court’s jurisdiction arises from section 1338.  Section 1338(a) grants 
jurisdiction over cases that relate to patents to the district courts. 
 33  28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1993).  The Federal Courts Improvement Act conferred to 
the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over the following patent issues: (1) appeals from the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, (2) appeals from district courts in 
infringement and other patent suits, (3) appeals from the United States Court of Claims, 
and (4) appeals from the United States International Trade Commission.  See Chisum, 
supra note 14, at § 11.06(e).  Prior to October 1, 1982, two courts had jurisdiction over 
patent appeals, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals (CCPA); see id. at § 11.06(c)(iv)(A).  
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required to trigger the critical date of the “on sale” bar, the Federal Circuit never 
explicitly adopted in whole the “reduction to practice” test.34   
D. UMC. Electronics Co. v. United States 35 
 
  In UMC, the Federal Circuit held that reduction to practice of the 
invention is not a requirement of the “on sale” bar.36  In finding UMC’s patent 
invalid, the court stated that “all of the circumstances surrounding the sale or 
                                                 
 34  See Rooklidge & Hoffmann III, supra note 13, at 25.  In Barmag Barmer 
Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the Federal 
Circuit applied the Timely Products Test to invalidate Barmag’s patent for a machine for 
processing filament yarn.  However, the Federal Circuit indicated in dicta that it would 
not adopt the Timely Products reduction to practice requirement in all cases.  Id. at 837.  
The court reasoned that many situations could arise where “because commercial benefits 
outside the allowed time have been great, the technical requisite of Timely Products for a 
physical embodiment, particularly for a simple product would defeat the statutory policy. 
. . .”  Id.  
 35   816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).   
 36  Id. at 656 (stating that a “reduction to practice of the claimed invention has 
not been . . .  an absolute requirement of the on sale bar.”)  However the Federal Circuit 
stated the importance of a reduction to practice in analyzing the on sale bar by stating: 
A holding that there has or has not been a reduction to practice of the claimed 
invention before the critical date may well determine whether the claimed invention 
was in fact the subject of the sale or offer to sell or whether a sale was primarily for 
an experimental purpose.   
Id.  The Federal Circuit also stated that “reduction to practice” is a term of art used in 
interference proceedings to determine the first to invent.  Id. at 655.  However, if the 
invention is actually reduced to practice prior to the sale or offer for sale and a patent 
application is not filed within a year of the sale or offer for sale, a patent will likely be 
barred.  Id. at 656.  The court stated that reduction to practice is “an important analytical 
tool in an on-sale analysis.”  Id.  For more information on the UMC Electronics case, see 
Schacht, supra note 6; William C. Rooklidge & Stephen C Jensen, Common Sense, 
Simplicity and Experimental Use Negation of the Public Use and On Sale Bars to 
Patentability, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1995).  In UMC Electronics Co. v. United 
States, 816 F.2d 647, UMC Electronics brought suit against the United States for 
infringement by the Navy of UMC’s patent for an aviation accelerometer after the Navy 
awarded a contract to UMC’s competitor, Systron-Donner Corp.  Weaver, an inventor 
working for UMC, invented an improved accelerometer in an effort to secure a contract 
with the Navy.  Id. at 649.  UMC filed a patent application for Weaver’s accelerometer 
on August 1, 1968.  Id.  The trial court found that UMC submitted a bid to the Navy for 
the claimed accelerometer on July 27, 1967, four days prior to the critical date.  Id. at 
650.  The trial court also found that prior to the critical date, Weaver had tested to his 
satisfaction the part of the accelerometer that he improved.  Id.  However, the trial court 
found that the prototype built by UMC did not embody the claimed invention; therefore, 
prior to the critical date, no physical embodiment of the invention existed.  Id. at 651.  
9
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offer to sell, including the stage of development of the invention and the nature 
of the invention, must be considered and weighed against the policies underlying 
section 102(b).”37  The Federal Circuit stated that a “substantial embodiment” of 
the claimed invention is required to bar patentability under the “on sale” bar but 
refused to establish a bright line test for determining when a “substantial 
embodiment” exists.38   
 
E. Post-UMC Federal Circuit Cases. 
 
 Over the ten years since the Federal Circuit’s decision in UMC, there is still a 
great deal of uncertainty regarding the extent of development required for an 
invention to be “on sale.”39  In Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court 
Construction40, the Federal Circuit reverted back to pre-UMC doctrine. 41  The 
Federal Circuit then narrowed the UMC “substantially complete invention” test 
in two early 1997 cases.42  In Micro Chemical v. Great Plains Chemical43, the 
Federal Circuit stated that the inventor had not substantially completed the 
invention because he “had not demonstrated a high likelihood that the invention 
would work for its intended purpose upon completion . . . .”44  The Federal 
Circuit again seemed to narrow the meaning of “substantially complete” when 
the court held that the incomplete development of software necessary for the 
                                                 
 37  See UMC Electronics, 816 F.2d at 656.  For a critique of the totality of the 
circumstances test, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175 (1989). 
 38  UMC Electronics, 816 F.2d at 657.   
 39  See generally Mueller, supra note 6, at 312. 
 40  98 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 41  Id. at 1324 (stating that “[t]he general rule is that the on-sale bar starts to 
accrue when a completed invention is offered for sale . . . .  The trier of fact must 
determine whether the invention was completed and known to work for its intended 
purpose, or whether the inventor was continuing to develop and evaluate the invention.”); 
see also Mueller, supra note 6, at 312. 
 42  See Schutz, supra note 23, at C19. 
 43  103 F.3d 1538, (Fed. Cir. 1997).  The patent in Micro Chemical consisted of 
method and apparatus claims for adding growth promotion and sickness prevention 
ingredients to the feed of livestock and poultry.  Id. at 1540.  At the time the inventor 
offered the invention for sale, the inventor had not yet constructed a slurry or mixing 
system.  Id. at 1543.  Upon building a prototype of the invention offered for sale, the 
inventor detected problems due to vibrations caused by the mixing system.  Id.  In order 
to alleviate the problems caused by the vibration, the inventor added new elements to the 
prototype to isolate the vibration.  Id. 
 44  Id. at 1545.  The above language used by the court is very similar to the 
second part, reduction to practice step, of the Timely Products Test.  See Schutz, supra 
note 23, at c19. 
10
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operation of the invention, but not part of the claimed invention, was sufficient to 
preclude the application of the “on sale” bar.45  Then, with its opinion in Pfaff v. 
Wells, in September of 1997, the Federal Circuit broadened the application of the 
“on sale” bar by expanding the meaning of “substantially completed.”46 
 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
A. Facts 
 
 In November 1980, Texas Instruments asked Pfaff to develop a socket for 
testing leadless chip carriers.47  On March 17, 1981, Pfaff’s company, 
Plastronics, received a verbal purchase order for over 30,000 sockets.48  By 
April 8, 1981, Pfaff had prepared detailed engineering drawings of his socket and 
had sent these drawings to a manufacturer to prepare customized tooling. 49  On 
April 8, 1981, Pfaff received a written purchase order which confirmed the verbal 
order and referenced an engineering drawing for the socket.50  The sockets were 
manufactured and shipped  
to Delta V in July, 1981.51  Pfaff filed for a U.S. patent for his socket on April 
19, 1982,52 thus the critical date for Pfaff’s invention was April 19, 1981.53   
                                                 
 45  Robotic Vision Sys. Inc. v. View Eng’g Inc., 112 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 46  See Mueller, supra note 6, at 314-15. 
 47  Pfaff, 124 F.3d at 1432.   
A leadless chip carrier is a protective enclosure for chips.  An integrated circuit chip 
is packaged within a ceramic or plastic carrier which incorporates electrical leads for 
connecting the chip to other circuitry . . . .  When a leadless chip carrier is mounted 
for testing or for connection with a circuit board, the terminal lands on the carrier 
must be aligned with corresponding contacts in the housing into which the carrier is 
placed. 
See Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 5 F.3d 515, n1 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 48  Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 2, Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 1997 
U.S. Briefs 1130 (1998) (No. 97-1130).  The verbal purchase order was given to Pfaff by 
Delta V, a company acting on behalf of Texas Instruments.  Pfaff, 124 F.3d at 1432.  The 
total value of the order for the 30,100 sockets was $91,155.  Id. at 1433.  Pfaff and Texas 
instruments discuss an order for 25,000 sockets as early as February 25, 1981.  
Respondent’s Brief at 2. 
 49  Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 1997 U.S. Briefs 
1130 (1998) (No. 97-1130).   
 50  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 49, at 4. 
 51  Pfaff, 124 F.3d at 1432.  Pfaff’s company Plastronics did not manufacture the 
sockets, instead Pfaff subcontracted the order to Weiss-Aug.  Id.  At no time was a 
prototype socket built or tested, Weiss-Aug used the engineering drawings prepared by 
Pfaff to build customized tooling and then proceeded directly into the manufacture of the 
order for Texas Instruments.  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 48, at 2. 
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B. Procedural History 
 
 In 1991, Pfaff filed suit in the Northern District of Texas against Wells 
Electronics Inc., claiming infringement of his patent.54  The District Court 
granted summary judgment to Wells Electronics.55  Pfaff appealed the summary 
                                                                                                                         
 52  Pfaff’s application issued as U.S. Pat. 4,491,377 (hereinafter ‘377) on January 
1, 1995.  U.S. Pat. 4,491,377 (1995).  The issued patent was for a socket for testing 
leadless chip carriers.  Id.  Claim 1 of Pat. No. ‘377 is representative of Pfaff’s invention 
and reads: 
1.  Mounting means for a leadless chip carrier comprising:  (a) base support means 
having first and second oppositely disposed major faces; (b) a plurality of axially 
elongated conductive pins passing transversely through said base support means 
substantially perpendicular to said first and second major faces, the opposed inner 
edges of the ends of said pins extending from said first major face arranged to define 
a cavity substantially conforming to at least two oppositely disposed lateral 
peripheral dimensions of said leadless chip carrier in a plane parallel with said first 
major face and the inner edges of said pins converging slightly inwardly with 
distance from said first major face; and (c) unitary means operable independently of 
said leadless chip carrier reciprocally moveable axially with respect to said pins and 
coacting with said opposed inner edges of said pins for uniformly spreading the ends 
of said pins extending from said first major face to permit the insertion of a leadless 
chip carrier there between. 
Id. 
 53  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 48, at 1. 
 54  Id. at 3.  Pfaff claims that the Wells’ socket infringed claims 1, 6-7, 10-11, 
and 19 of his patent ‘377.  Pfaff, 5 F.3d at 516.  This is actually the second suit Pfaff has 
filed against Wells Electronics, Inc for infringement of his patent ‘377.  Brief for the 
Petitioner, supra note 49, at 5.  In the first suit, the District Court for the Northern District 
of Indiana found that Wells’ device did not infringe patent ‘377 because the pins in the 
Wells’ device were not axially elongated and did not incline in a plane substantially 
parallel to the first major face.  Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., Nos. 88-1607, 88-1608, 
1989 WL 100063 at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  In response to Wells’ defense of invalidity per 
the “on sale” bar, the District Court held that the invention could not have been on sale 
prior to the critical date because it was not “reduced to practice.”  Brief for the Petitioner, 
supra note 49, at 5.  Both parties appealed to the Federal Circuit.  Pfaff v. Wells 
Electronics, Inc., Nos. 88-1607, 88-1608, 1989 WL 100063 at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the District Courts ruling on non-infringement and then vacated 
the issue of patent validity as moot.  Id.  Shortly after this first suit, Wells modified their 
socket and this current suit commenced to determine if this new socket infringed Pfaff’s 
patent ‘377.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 49, at 5. 
 55  Pfaff, 5 F.3d at 515-16.  The District Court found that “the unitary spreader 
means [in the Wells’ sockets] do not coact with the inner edges of the conductive pins 
that define the cavity . . .” and thus, do not infringe on Pfaff’s patent.  Id. at 516.  The 
court also held that Pfaff was barred by prosecution history estoppel from claiming 
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judgment to the Federal Circuit, which found a genuine issue of material fact and 
reversed and remanded the case.56  The remanded case was referred to a Special 
Master57 for a non-jury trial.58  The Special Master determined that claims 1 
and 6 were invalid under §102(b),59 and that other claims in the patent were 
valid and infringed60 by Wells’ sockets.61  The District Court adopted the 
findings of the Special Master and both parties appealed to the Federal Circuit62   
                                                                                                                         
infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents.  Id.  On June 12, 1992, Pfaff filed a 
motion for reconsideration to the District Court along with “expert affidavits testifying 
that the Wells spreaders coact with [the] ‘inner edges of the conductive pins.’ ”  Id. at 
517.  The District Court denied Pfaff’s motion for reconsideration.  Id.  For a 
comprehensive discussion of prosecution history estoppel, see Note, To Bar Or Not to 
Bar: Prosecution History Estoppel After Warner-Jenkinson, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2330 
(1998).  For a comprehensive discussion of the Doctrine of Equivalents, see Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 111 HARV. L. REV. 400 (1997). 
 56  Pfaff, 5 F.3d at 520. 
 57  The court has the ability to appoint a special master.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a).  If both 
parties consent, a magistrate judge may serve as a special master.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b).  
The judge may specify or limit the power of the special master in the order of reference 
to the master.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(c).  The use of special masters in patent litigation is 
increasing as judges often assign a special master to hear discovery matters and 
dispositive motions.  William J. Robinson, Patent Litigation 1997: Tips on the Way to 
Trial, 492 P.L.I./PAT 63, 70 (1997).  For a more comprehensive look at the role of a 
special master, see Margaret G. Farrell, The Role of Special Masters in Federal 
Litigation, C842 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 931 (1993). 
 58  Pfaff, 124 F.3d at 1432. 
 59  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 48, at 3.  Commonly in a patent infringement 
suit, as a defense to the infringement claim, the alleged infringer will attempt to prove 
that the plaintiff’s patent is invalid.  L. Craig Metcalf, Satisfying Rule 11 Prior to 
Initiating Patent Infringement Claims, 7 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 321, 327 (1997). 
 60  For literal infringement to occur, the claims of the patent must read literally 
on the accused device and the structures must “do the same work, in substantially the 
same way, and accomplish substantially the same result.”  Dominion Magnesium Ltd. v. 
U.S., 320 F.2d 388, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1963).  A party can also infringe a patent under the 
doctrine of equivalents.  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 
605, 609 (1950).  In Graver, the court stated that “[u]nder this doctrine, a product or 
process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may 
nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the 
accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.”  Id.  For 
a more detailed look at the doctrine of equivalents, see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton 
Davis Chem., Inc., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 61  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 48, at 3.  In finding some claims of patent 
‘377 valid, the Special Master held the invention could not have been on sale prior to the 
critical date because the invention had not been reduced to practice and no physical 
embodiment existed at the time of the order from Texas Instruments.  Id.  
 62  Pfaff, 124 F.3d at 1432. 
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 In a unanimous decision, the Federal Circuit held that all of the claims of U.S 
Patent 4,491,377 at issue in this case were invalid because the invention was 
“substantially complete” and commercialized prior to the critical date.63  The 
Federal Circuit stated that the District Court failed to follow the UMC holding, 
which stated that a reduction to practice was not required for applying the “on 
sale” bar.64  The Federal Circuit based its decision that Pfaff’s invention was 
“substantially complete” on “all of the circumstances” surrounding the sale.65 
 
C.  Holding 
 
 In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the Federal Circuit, holding the claims at issue in Pfaff’s patent ‘377 
invalid under the “on sale” bar.66  However, in coming to this conclusion, the 
Supreme Court rejected the “substantially complete” reasoning of the Federal 
Circuit and established a new test for determining when the “on sale” bar 
applies.67  The Supreme Court held that the “on sale” bar applies when the 
following two conditions are met prior to the critical date:  (1) “the product [is] 
                                                 
 63  Id. at 1439.  Of the six claims at issue in this suit, the Federal Circuit found 
four of the claims, claims 1, 6, 7, and 10, invalid under § 102(b).  Id. at 1435.  The two 
other claims, claims 11 and 19, were found invalid under § 102(b)/103 bar.  Id. at 1439.  
The court’s § 102(b)/103 rejection of claims 11 and 19 “reaffirmed long-standing 
precedent that, under Sections 102(b) and 103 of the Patent Act, the on-sale bar also 
applies to claims that would have been obvious in light of the prior art combined with 
what actually had been on sale as of the critical date.”  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 
48, at 3. 
 64  Pfaff, 124 F.3d at 1433.  The court stated that “[a]lthough the invention was 
commercialized, it had not been reduced to practice at the time of sale because there was 
no physical embodiment of the invention.  It was for this reason alone that the district 
court did not apply the on-sale bar.”  Id.  The Federal Circuit then stated that in Barmag, 
731 F.2d 831, the physical embodiment requirement was expressly rejected.  Pfaff, 124 
F.3d at 1434. 
 65  Id.  The court stated that “[u]nder all of the circumstances, including the 
completion of engineering drawings, the ordering of production tooling, and the 
commencement of fabrication of the tooling necessary to manufacture the invention for a 
specific customer, it is clear that more than a mere concept was on sale.  The substantially 
completed socket had entered the production phase prior to the critical date and specific 
purchase order was being filled.”  Id. 
 66  Pfaff, 119 S. Ct. at 312.. 
 67  Id. at 311.  The court stated that “[t]he word ‘invention’ must refer to a concept 
that is complete, rather than merely one that is ‘substantially complete.’ ”  Id.  The 
Supreme Court also stated that the “substantially complete” test set forth by the Federal 
Circuit “seriously undermines the interest in certainty” and “finds no support in the text 
of the statute.”  See id.  
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the subject of a commercial offer for sale,” and (2) “the invention must be ready 
for patenting.”68  The Supreme Court stated that the invention may be found 
“ready for patenting” if there is “proof of reduction to practice before the critical 
date, or by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings 
or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a 
person skilled in the art to practice the invention.”69  Thus, the Supreme Court 
also rejected Pfaff’s argument that an “invention” requires an actual reduction to 
practice.70   
 
A. ANALYSIS 
 
 There are four reasons why the Supreme Court’s decision to bar Pfaff’s patent 
as “on sale” is correct.  First, the Patent Act does not require an actual reduction 
to practice for an invention to exist.71  Secondly, the subject matter placed on 
sale is prior art for all elements it teaches.72  Third, the requirement of an actual 
reduction to practice is inconsistent with the policies of the “on sale” bar.73  
Fourth, the test established by the Supreme Court provides a clearer “Bright 
Line” than Pfaff’s actual reduction to practice requirement.74 
 
A. The Patent Act does not Require an Actual Reduction to Practice 
 
 The “on sale” bar provides that a patent may not be obtained for an 
“invention” on sale in this country more than one year prior to the filing of a U.S 
                                                 
 68  See id. at 311-12.  The Supreme Court found that Pfaff’s invention was the subject 
of a commercial offer for sale prior to the critical date as evidenced by the purchase order 
dated April 8, 1981.  Id. at 312.  To support the “ready for patenting” language, the 
Supreme Court quoted the following language from Learned Hand’s opinion in 
Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d 
Cir. 1946):  “It is a condition upon an inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not exploit 
his discovery completely after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself with 
either secrecy, or legal monopoly.”  Id. 
 69  Pfaff, 119 S. Ct. at 312.  Thus, the Supreme Court found that Pfaff’s invention 
was “ready for patenting” because Pfaff had sent completed drawings of the invention to 
the manufacture prior to the critical date.  Id. 
 70  Id. at 309.  The Supreme Court supported this decision by looking to The 
Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888), where the Supreme Court upheld a patent granted to 
Alexander Graham Bell even though he had not yet reduced his invention to practice.  Id. 
at 309. 
 71  See infra notes 75-98 and accompanying text. 
 72  See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text. 
 73  See infra notes 108-122 and accompanying text. 
 74  See infra notes 122-129 and accompanying text. 
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patent application.75  The requirements of an “invention” are not defined in the 
Patent Act.76  Pfaff argued that Congress defined the term “invention” in § 
102(g) as requiring both conception and actual reduction to practice.77  Thus, 
since “identical words in different parts of the same act are intended to have the 
same meaning,”78 the term invention in § 102(b) also requires both conception 
and actual reduction to practice.79  Pfaff concludes that since Congress expressly 
requires both conception and reduction to practice, the courts are not at liberty to 
amend the meaning of the statute.80  However, Pfaff’s argument that actual 
reduction to practice is required for an invention to exist is incorrect for three 
reasons.  First, the Patent Act allows for an invention to exist without actual 
reduction to practice.81  Second, Pfaff’s  definition  of  invention  is  inconsistent  
                                                 
 75  35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1984).  
 76  The Patent Act is codified in United States Code, Title 35.  The only 
definition of the term invention in the Patent Act is as follows:  “The term ‘invention’ 
means invention or discovery.”  35 U.S.C. §100 (1984). 
 77  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 49, at 12-13.  Pfaff’s two requirements of 
invention come from the following language of § 102: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless: 
(g) before the applicant’s invention thereof the invention was made in this country by 
another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.  In determining priority 
of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and 
reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who 
was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception 
by the other. 
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1984).  Pfaff argues that “Congress did not define ‘invention’ in the 
traditional patent form – not in the form of ‘an invention is [blank],’ but rather in terms of 
its two constituent acts or elements:  ‘conception’ and ‘reduction to practice.’ “  Brief for 
the Petitioner, supra note 49, at 12-13. 
 78  Sulivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (holding that “identical words in 
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning”). 
 79  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 49, at 10. 
 80  Id. at 10.  Pfaff supports his conclusion by citing the following Supreme 
Court decisions concerning statutory interpretation: Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 
498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990) (stating “[t]o discern Congress' intent we examine the explicit 
statutory language and the structure and purpose of the statute.”); Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (stating that “[the court’s] task is to give 
effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain 
terms, ‘that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive’ ”).  Id. 
 81  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curie Supporting Respondent at 14, 
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 1997 U.S. Briefs 1130 (1998) (No. 97-1130). 
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with  its  use  throughout   § 102.82  Third, § 102(g) defines priority among 
inventors in an interference proceeding, not the term “invention.”83  
 
 1. The Patent Act allows an invention without the Actual Reduction to 
Practice. 
 
 Section 101 of the Patent Act indicates that an inventor can obtain a patent for 
his invention subject to the conditions of Title 35.84  The Supreme Court has 
stated that there are three conditions for patentability: utility, novelty, and non-
obviousness.85  Inventors have been able to obtain a patent for their inventions 
as long as these three requirements are met and the patent application meets the 
requirements of § 112,86 regardless of whether the invention was actually 
                                                 
 82  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 48, at 17. 
 83  Id. at 13-14; UMC Electronics, 816 F.2d at 653 n.7.  An interference 
proceeding is a process to determine who among multiple patent applicants, or an 
applicant and a patent holder, was the first person to invent the claimed subject matter.  
Chisum, supra note 14, at § 10.09.  For a more comprehensive discussion of interference 
proceedings, see Christian J. Garascia, Note, Evidence of Conception in U.S.  Patent 
Interference  Practice: Proving Who is the First and True Inventor, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 717 (1996).  An overview of an interference proceeding is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 
135. 
 84  35 U.S.C. § 101 stating in full: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984). 
 85  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966).  The utility requirement of 
patentability is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The novelty requirement of patentability is 
codified in 35 U.S.C. §102.  The non-obviousness requirement of patentability is codified 
in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1984). 
 86  The first paragraph of § 112 requires that a patent application fully and 
completely describe the invention, enable one skilled in the art to make and use the 
invention, and set forth the best mode known to the inventor of practicing the invention.  
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1984).  The first paragraph of Section 112 states: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it 
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1984). 
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reduced to practice.87  Thus, an invention does not require an actual reduction to 
practice.88 
 
2. The Actual Reduction to Practice requirement of an invention is 
inconsistent with the use of an invention throughout § 102. 
 
 Sections 102(a) and 102(e) describe prior art which will prevent patentability 
of an invention.89  Section 102(a) establishes patents and printed publications as 
prior art.90  Section 102(e) establishes a granted patent as prior art.91  However, 
if an actual reduction to practice were required for an invention, the critical dates 
for both § 102(a) and § 102(e) would be the date the subject matter was actually 
reduced to practice.92  However, courts historically have held that for purposes 
of prior art, the subject matter need not be reduced to practice.93   
 
3. Section 102(g) defines priority among inventors in an interference 
proceeding, not the term “invention.” 
 
                                                 
 87  The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888) (upholding a patent issued to 
Alexander Graham Bell even though he filed his application before constructing a 
working telephone). 
 88  See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curie Supporting 
Respondent, supra note 81, at 13-15. 
 89  See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1984).  “[P]rior art, which is defined as any 
reference, sale, use or knowledge of the invention which predated the filing of a patent 
application for it.”  See Charles R. B. Macedo, Note, First to File: Is American Adoption 
of the International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price? 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
543, 546 (1988). 
 90  35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b) (1984).  Section 102(a) states that “a person shall 
be entitled to a patent unless: (a) the invention was known or used by others in this 
country, or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the 
invention thereof by the applicant for patent.”  35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1984).   
 91  35 U.S.C. §102(e) (1984).  Section 102(e) states that: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless (e) the invention was described in a 
patent granted on an application for a patent by another filed in the United States 
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or on an international 
application by another who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and 
(4) of sections 371(c) this title before the invention thereof by the applicant for 
patent. 
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1984). 
 92  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 48, at 17-22. 
 93  In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that a publication 
is prior art if it sufficiently describes the claimed invention); Alexander Milburn Co. v. 
Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1926) (discussing that a prior patent is 
prior art).  
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 The only place in sections 100 to 103 where the term “reduction to practice” is 
mentioned is in § 102(g).94  However, the main purpose of § 102(g) is to 
determine who, among competing inventors, was the first to invent.95  If an 
actual reduction to practice is required for an invention, per the first sentence of § 
102(g), then the first to invent will always be the first to both conceive and 
reduce to practice.96  However, the second sentence of § 102(g) states that the 
first to conceive an invention but the second to reduce to practice is still the first 
to invent, as long as he is reasonably diligent in his effort to reduce the invention 
to practice.97  Thus, “under § 102(g), reduction to practice is not even 
dispositive for determining priority of invention.”98 
 
B.  The Subject Matter Placed On Sale Should Be Prior Art for All Elements It 
Teaches.99 
 
 A patent or a publication that fails to disclose every element of a claimed 
invention is still considered prior art for all that it teaches.100  The elements 
taught by these patents and publications can be combined under § 103 to prohibit 
patenting of an invention.101  However, to be prior art under § 102(b) because it 
was "on sale," an invention must have been on sale more than one year before the 
                                                 
 94  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curie Supporting Respondent, supra 
note 81, at 14. 
 95  S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399 
(stating “[s]ubsection (g) relates to the question of priority of invention between rival 
inventors”); see also MARTIN J ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT 
LAW § 5.2(b), at 325 (1998) stating that the general rule for § 102(g) is that: 
[T]he first inventor to reduce an invention to practice wins the priority contest.  But 
if the inventor who is first to conceive the invention, but second to reduce the 
invention to practice, can show diligence from the time prior to the conception date 
of the first to reduce to practice, he will displace the first to reduce the invention to 
practice as the first inventor at law. 
Id. 
 96  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 48, at 15.   
 97 Id.; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae View Engineering, Inc. In Support of 
Respondent, 1997 U.S. Briefs 1997 (1998) (97-1130).  
 98  Id. at 4. 
 99  Id. at 9. 
 100  Id. at 9-10;  35 U.S.C §102(a)-(b). 
 101  In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1482, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(stating "[i]n reviewing the Board's obviousness conclusions, we have been guided by the 
well-settled principles that the claimed invention must be considered as a whole, multiple 
cited prior art references must suggest the desirability of being combined, and the 
references  must be viewed without the benefit of hindsight afforded by the disclosure"). 
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filing date and must be substantially complete.102  The law should consider any 
invention which is offered for sale as prior art, whether it is substantially 
complete or not.103  Thus, the subject matter which became available to the 
public through the offer for sale may be used as prior art to reject an application 
as anticipated under § 102104 or obvious under § 103.105  This will prevent the 
shrewd inventor from deliberately refusing to finish the final steps of actual 
reduction to practice during the period that the invention is offered for sale in 
order to circumvent the “on sale” bar.106  Allowing the subject matter of an 
offer for sale to be prior art no matter how developed the invention may be, is 
consistent with the policy against removing inventions from the public which the 
public has justifiably come to believe are freely available.107 
 
                                                 
 102  UMC Electronics, 816 F.2d at 657; see also Patrick F. Bright et al., The 
Written Aspects of Jury Patent Practice, Including Charge Conference Practice, 376 
P.L.I./PAT 47, 127 (1993); Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const., 98 F.3d 
1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Bryson, J., concurring) (stating “if the sale or offer in 
question embodies the invention for which a patent is later sought, a sale or offer to sell 
that is primarily for commercial purposes and that occurs more than one year before the 
application renders the invention unpatentable.”). 
 103  Brief of Amicus Curiae View Engineering, Inc.  In Support of Respondent, 
supra note 97, at 11. 
 104  An invention is considered anticipated by a prior art reference if all elements 
of the claimed invention can be found within one prior art reference.  ADELMAN, supra 
note 95, at 389; see also Straussler v. U.S., 339 F.2d 670, 671 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (stating “the 
reference must disclose all the elements of the claimed combination, or their mechanical 
equivalents, functioning in substantially the same way to produce substantially the same 
result”). 
 105  Brief of Amicus Curiae View Engineering, Inc.; In Support of Respondent, 
supra note 97, at 11; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 150 (1989) (stating “[t]he nonobviousness requirement extends the field of 
unpatentable material beyond that which is known to the public under § 102 to include 
that which could readily be deduced from publicly available material by a person of 
ordinary skill in the pertinent field of endeavor”).  To show the obviousness of a claimed 
invention, multiple prior art references are combined.  See generally Lear Siegler, Inc. v. 
Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 106  Brief of the Dallas-Fort Worth Intellectual Property Law Association As 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10-12, Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 1997 
U.S. Briefs 1130 (1998) (No. 97-1130) (stating that an invention does not always need to 
be completely fabricated in order to be commercialized through a sale and the actual 
reduction to practice standard advocated by the Petitioner will allow inventors to 
circumvent the “on sale” bar by refusing to complete their invention). 
 107  For more information on this policy concern, see supra note 16-20 and 
accompanying text.   
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C. The Requirement of an Actual Reduction to Practice is Inconsistent with the 
Policies of the “On Sale” Bar.108 
 
 The patent laws establish a bargain between the public and the inventor for 
promoting technology.109  In exchange for a limited monopoly on the 
                                                 
 108  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 48, at 24.   
 109  See generally ADELMAN, supra note 95, at 8; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989) (stating “[t]he federal patent 
system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and 
disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design in return 
for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years”). 
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 invention,110 the inventor must disclose to the public how the invention 
works.111  The policy reasons for the “on sale” bar help to further this bargain 
by focusing on the impact of commercialization of the invention.112  First, the 
policy favoring prompt and widespread disclosure of new inventions is served by 
not requiring an actual reduction to practice because it encourages the inventor to 
file for a patent within one year of the offer for sale.113  Pfaff argued that 
requiring the filing of an application prior to reduction to practice is contrary to 
this policy because it forces the inventor to make a premature disclosure of the 
invention.114  However, under the Supreme Court’s test, the inventor is not 
required to file for a patent until the invention is “ready for patenting.”115  Thus, 
the Supreme Court’s test prevents an inventor from commercially exploiting the 
exclusivity of his invention substantially beyond the statutorily authorized 
period.116  If reduction to practice was required for the “on sale” bar to apply, an 
inventor could offer an invention for sale with no fear of losing his patent rights 
                                                 
 110  The length of the limited monopoly, or patent term, granted to the inventor is 
currently twenty (20) years from the filing date of the patent application for a utility 
patent.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1984).  However, if the patent was filed before June 8, 
1995, the patent term is either twenty (20) years from the filing date or seventeen (17) 
years from the issue date, whichever is longer.  35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (1984).  For a 
design patent, the patent term is fourteen (14) years from the issue date of the patent.  35 
U.S.C. § 173 (1984). 
 111  The inventor tells the public how the invention works in the specification of 
the invention which must meet the requirements set forth in the first paragraph of Section 
112 of the Patent Act.  See supra note 86. 
 112  Brief of the Dallas-Fort Worth Intellectual Property Law Association, supra 
note 106, at 10; see infra, notes 19-22 and accompanying text for the four policy reasons 
for the “on sale” bar. 
 113  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 47, at 25.  This policy of prompt and 
widespread disclosure of new inventions prevents inventors from delaying the disclosure 
of their invention to the public.  Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829) stating: 
[i]f an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the public 
the secrets of his invention; if he should for a long period of years retain the 
monopoly, and make, and sell his invention publicly, and thus gather the whole 
profits of it, relying upon his superior skill and knowledge of the structure; and then, 
and then only, when the danger of competition should force him to secure the 
exclusive right, he should be allowed to take out a patent, and thus exclude the public 
from any farther use than what should be derived under it during his fourteen years; 
it would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts, and give a 
premium to those who should be least prompt to communicate their discoveries. 
 114  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 49, at 31-32. 
 115  Pfaff, 119 S. Ct. at 311. 
 116  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 48, at 27.  For the length of the statutorily 
authorized period of monopoly, see supra note 110. 
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as long as the invention was not actually reduced to practice.117  As stated 
previously, this would allow the shrewd inventor to circumvent the “on sale” 
bar.118  As a result, the inventor could extend his patent monopoly by delaying 
the filing of his patent until it is necessary to thwart the competition.119  Pfaff 
argued that “Section[s] 102(c) and 102(g) offer sufficient countervailing 
pressures and incentives toward diligent reduction to practice and timely 
applications for patent.”120  However, Pfaff himself admitted that § 102(g) does 
not apply unless the invention is “reduced to practice.”121  Additionally, § 
102(c) will not provide sufficient pressure for an inventor to reduce his invention 
to practice because whether the applicant has abandoned his invention is a 
question of intent.122 
 
D. The Test Established by the Supreme Court Provides a Clearer “Bright Line” 
than Pfaff’s Actual Reduction to Practice Requirement 
 
 The test established by the Supreme Court requires two specific requirements 
to be met before the “on sale” bar applies:  a commercial offer for sale and an 
invention which is ready for patenting.123  The Court also stated that an 
invention will be considered “ready for patenting” when it is either reduced to 
                                                 
 117  See generally In re Mahurkar Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1370 (N.D. 
Ill. 1993) (“[S]ometimes the ordinary course of commerce entails genuine sales of 
prototypes or even of concepts.  In many industries--military aviation being a prime 
example--commercial sales occur while the items are still being developed.  The vendor 
sells the germ of an idea and works out the bugs later, often in cooperation with the 
principal customer.  Revenues flow in, and knowledge that the developer will seek a 
patent discourages rivals from investing in what may be expensive work along the same 
lines.”). 
 118  See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  A clever patent attorney may 
also be able to protect his client from the “on sale” bar by carefully drafting the claims of 
the patent to insure that the invention offered for sale was not completely reduced to 
practice.  See generally UMC Electronics, 816 F.2d at 655 (stating that “by invoking 
reduction to practice as developed in interference law, an inventor might be able to 
escape the on-sale bar simply through deft claim draftsmanship.”). 
 119  Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19.   
 120  Reply Brief for the Petitioner, at 18, Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 1997 
U.S. Briefs 1130 (1998) (No. 97-1130). 
 121  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 49, at 12-13.  Pfaff basis his argument 
that Congress expressly defined the term “invention” as requiring a “reduction to 
practice’ on the language of § 102(g).  Id. at 12-16. 
 122  In re Gibbs, 437 F.2d 486, 489 (CCPA 1971); see also Stephen L. Carter, 
How to Decide Whether to Seek a Patent: Legal Considerations, 343 P.L.I./PAT 63, 83 
(1992).   
 123  Pfaff, 119 S. Ct. at 311-12. 
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practice or “the inventor [has] prepared drawings or other descriptions of the 
invention that [are] sufficient to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the 
invention.”124  Pfaff argued that read properly, to require actual reduction to 
practice, § 102(b) would provide a bright line test for determining the triggering 
of the critical date.125 However, Pfaff’s actual reduction to practice test would 
not have provided a clear bright line test.126  Instead, Pfaff’s test would have 
required a fact-intensive inquiry, similar to that in an interference proceeding, to 
decide when the invention was actually reduced to practice.127  As in an 
interference proceeding, the determination of the “critical date” for the “on sale” 
bar under Pfaff’s proposed test would require the parties to spend a lot of money 
and litigate for many years.128  Thus, in cases with facts similar to Pfaff v. Wells 
Electronics, Inc., the actual reduction to practice test proposed by Pfaff would 
not have provided a clear “bright line” for determining when the one year grace 
period began, but instead would have resulted in years of litigation to determine 
when the invention was actually reduced to practice.129 
                                                 
 124  See id. 
 125  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 49, at 13.  Pfaff claims that “[a]n inventor 
can easily ascertain when a working embodiment was first physically made,” thus 
providing a bright line rule in determining the critical date.  Reply Brief for the 
Petitioner, supra note 120, at n.25.  
 126  Cf. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 47, at 28; Brief of Amicus Curiae View 
Engineering, Inc. In Support of Respondent, supra note 97, at 22; Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curie Supporting Respondent, supra note 81, at 20. 
 127  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curie Supporting Respondent, supra 
note 81, at 20; see also Newkirk v. Lulejian, 825 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(“[P]roof of actual reduction to practice requires demonstration that the embodiment 
relied upon as evidence of priority actually worked for its intended purpose.  It is equally 
well established that every limitation of the interference count must exist in the 
embodiment and be shown to have performed as intended.”). 
 128  See generally Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(stating that the interference proceeding took over twelve years before the Board issued a 
decison); Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, S.P.A., 540 F.2d 611, 614 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(stating that the interference lasted over thirteen years and included the testimony of 126 
witnesses).  “The PTO spends over one million dollars a year in administering 
interferences and the costs to final hearing for each litigant averages approximately 
$100,000.”  Christian J. Garascia, Note, Evidence of Conception in U.S. Patent 
Interference Practice:  Proving Who is the First and True Inventor, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 717, 726 (1996). 
 129  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curie Supporting Respondent, supra 
note 81, at 20.  Some of the parties that submitted amicus briefs to the Supreme Court 
offer alternative tests which they claim promote greater predictability in applying the “on 
sale” bar than the Federal Circuits “substantially complete” test, two examples of 
proposed tests follow: 
The Unites States suggests the following approach to the “on sale” bar:   
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
 In Pfaff v. Wells Elecronics, Inc. the Supreme Court was confronted with the 
issue of whether patent claims were invalid under § 102(b) because a purchase 
order was issued for the product of an invention prior to the “critical date.”130  
Although the offer for sale was clearly before the “critical date,” the invention at 
issue was not yet reduced to practice at the time of the sale.131  Wisely, the 
Supreme Court found that the patent was invalid under § 102(b) because the 
invention was “the subject of a commercial offer for sale,” and was “ready for 
patenting.”132  This decision is consistent with the statutory language of Section 
102 and policies which support the “on sale” bar.133  Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court correctly decided that Pfaff’s patent was invalid per the “on sale” bar. 
 
Daniel J. Whitman 
 
 
         
                                                                                                                         
If an inventor offers to sell or sells an invention for commercial purposes, and the 
inventor fails to file an application for a patent within one year of the offer or the sale 
date, then the invention is not patentable unless the inventor can show that the 
claimed invention contains new features that would not have been obvious in light of 
the invention offered or sold. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curie Supporting Respondent, supra note 81, at 28. 
The Dallas-Fort Worth Intellectual Property Law Association suggests the following 
three prong test:   
 A. Do the commercial activities of the patentee and the offeree establish an identifiable 
sale or offer for sale of the invention more than one year before the filing date? 
B. Do the patentee’s and offeree’s intent and level of business acumen evidence a 
sale or offer for sale of the invention? 
C. Is the invention of a nature and stage of development such that it could be sold 
in a commercial transaction? 
Brief of the Dallas-Fort Worth Intellectual Property Law Association , supra note 106, at 
13-16. 
 130  Pfaff, 119 S. Ct. 304. 
 131  Pfaff, 124 F.3d at 1433. 
 132  Pfaff, 119 S. Ct. at 311 (stating that “[t]he evidence in this case thus fulfills 
the two essential conditions of the on-sale bar”). 
 133  See supra notes 70-129 and accompanying text. 
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